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Abstract:  The broadened scope of the GATT/WTO through successive rounds of trade liberalization is 
explained as a result of trade-partner specificity, linked agreements, and cross retaliation.  In more recent 
years, however, countries have pursued trade liberalization through sector specific zero-for-zero 
agreements and preferential trade agreements, both of which have a reduced chance of suffering cross 
retaliation.  This increase in unlinked agreements is explained by imperfect observability of trade policies 
generating gratuitous trade disputes and unjustified cross retaliation.  If the dispute generating noise is 
perfectly correlated across sectors, however, then it provides no reason not to link agreements in a static 
sense and in many cases incremental linking still produces more liberalization than static linking.  It is 
only when the noise is imperfectly correlated that linking and cross retaliation are problematic so that 
some sectors can enforce more liberalization in an unlinked agreement.  If the correlation drops, the noise 
increases, or the number of sectors already covered is large, then incremental linking of more sectors is 
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1.  Introduction 
  The GATT/WTO has presided over an impressive reduction in average tariffs since its inception 
in 1947.  This reduction occurred through successive reductions in the tariffs of already covered sectors 
and also through the gradual increase in the number of sectors included in the agreement.  It has also 
broadened its reach to liberalize trade in services and to establish rules for the international protection of 
intellectual property.  In a more recent trend, subgroups of WTO signatories have liberalized trade on 
well-defined groups of goods though sector-specific zero-for-zero agreements.
1  Furthermore, almost 400 
subgroups of WTO members have rushed to develop an astounding array of overlapping Preferential 
Trade Agreements (PTAs), with the great majority being formed in recent years.
2   
  In this paper we provide a unified explanation for the initial increase in the breadth of the 
GATT/WTO as well as more recent attempts at trade liberalization that exist partially beyond the auspices 
of the WTO.  Our idea is of two parts.  First, when cross retaliation is possible each additional linked 
sector increases the enforcement capability of the trade agreement and permits liberalization in still more 
sectors.  Second, imperfect observability of trade policies can generate trade disputes and unwarranted 
cross retaliation.  More recent trade agreements are unlinked, in part, to avoid cross retaliation.   
Interestingly, trade disputes only matter if the dispute generating noise is not perfectly correlated across 
sectors.  As the correlation drops and/or the noise increases, cross retaliation is more prevalent and some 
sectors only pursue liberalization through unlinked agreements.  The number of sectors already covered is 
eventually the biggest impediment to future linking.  There is a natural limit to the number of linked 
agreements (that depends on the correlation between the noise terms) so that when the existing agreement 
is mature and links many sectors, further liberalization is pursued through unlinked agreements.   
                                                      
1 Examples are the 1995 pharmaceutical tariff elimination agreement, the 1997 financial services agreement, and the 
1997 information technology agreement.  Other sector specific agreements, such as the multifiber agreement on 
textiles were much different in that they had a quota and a termination date for that quota (Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2001).  Many agricultural zero-for-agreements only levy zero tariffs up to the level of the quota.  When we refer to 
zero-for-zero agreements in this paper we will only be referring to the first group,.  
2 As of December 15, 2008 close to 400 PTAs were notified to the WTO of which 230 were still in force (195 of 
these 230 came into force since January 1, 1994 (the inception date of NAFTA and the EEA) and more than half 
came into force since January 1, 2002.  Mongolia is the only GATT/WTO signatory that has not joined a PTA, 
choosing instead a “Buddhist path of self-perfection and good WTO-consistent behaviour, without regard to whether 
other countries were doing the same”. (Economist, 2006).   2 
 
  Cross retaliation in sectors other than the one where the dispute originated is allowed for in the 
WTO’s dispute settlement understanding (DSU) article 22, paragraph 3, however, it specifically 
subordinates more distant cross-retaliations to those that are in the same sector or at least the same 
agreement.
3  In particular, paragraph 3(b) allows cross retaliation in other sectors (of the same agreement) 
only if same sector retaliation, as described in paragraph 3(a), “is not practical or effective” (WTO, 2008).  
Paragraph 3(c) allows for cross retaliation in other covered agreements (such as GATS or TRIPS) only if 
cross retaliation as allowed for in 3(b) “is not practical or effective”.  Paragraph 5 of article 22 prohibits 
cross retaliation if the covered agreement does not allow for suspension of concessions.  Other than these 
guidelines in paragraphs 3 and 5, the DSU provides no hard and fast rule on cross retaliation in zero-for-
zero sector specific agreements or even in PTAs.  Cross retaliation in these agreements, however, is much 
less likely and we use this fact in referring to them as unlinked agreements.
4,5  Our idea is that as the 
initial agreement becomes broader, these unlinked agreements become more popular.   
  Our analysis draws upon several distinct elements.  Recognizing that there are no international 
soldiers to enforce trade agreements authors such as Dixit (1987) and Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 1999, 
2002) began to look at trade agreements as self-enforcing outcomes in a repeated game framework.  We 
follow their idea and consider trade agreements as infinitely repeated games where the hope of future 
cooperation can enforce current trade liberalization.  Bernheim and Whinston (1990) – hereafter referred 
to as BW – analyzed how firms that link infinitely repeated pricing games can enforce more collusive 
outcomes in each market.  As in BW, cross retaliation can enforce more cooperative outcomes when the 
sectors are less similar.  The BW linking result is in a noiseless framework and all of the linking occurs at 
                                                      
3 Article 22.3 of the DSU never explicitly uses the word “cross-retaliation”, however, the WTO’s (2003) briefing for 
its fifth Cancún ministerial conference explains that it is the “short hand” word for what is described in article 22.3.  
4 There are a few examples of retaliation across agreements.  The WTO dispute settlement board has accepted 
Brazil’s request to cross retaliate U.S. cotton subsidies by withdrawing equivalent concessions in the GATS and 
TRIPS.  It has allowed Antigua to cross retaliate the prohibition of international internet gambling (a violation of 
GATS) by withdrawing concessions in TRIPS.  There has not yet been cross-retaliation in zero-for-zero sector 
specific agreements or in goods only covered in a PTA and not the WTO.  As mentioned above these retaliations are 
not prohibited only highly subordinated.  There may at present be a separate implicit arrangement to not cross 
retaliate in these other agreements – the analysis of which may present an interesting direction for further research.  
5 The U.S. and Mexico have both brought NAFTA cases to the WTO when the good is covered by both agreements.  
No cross retaliation in sectors that are covered only in NAFTA and not the WTO have been asked for or approved 
by the WTO.  The relationship between dispute settlement in the WTO and PTAs is well beyond the scope of this 
paper, however, it is an important area for further research.  3 
 
the same time, therefore, we refer to it is static noiseless linking.  Our third element draws upon the idea 
that participating in export markets requires ongoing trade and export promotion costs.
6  T h e s e  
irreversible costs change the structure of the trade agreement so that more and more sectors can be linked 
to the trade agreement over time.  In particular, sectors that cannot enforce free trade by themselves or as 
part of a static link can enforce free trade when incrementally linked in a later period.  Incremental 
noiseless linking is shown to enforce free trade in more groups than does static noiseless linking.   
  Our fourth component is the inclusion of noise in observing partners’ trade policies.  This noise is 
a product of macroeconomic instability or preference fluctuations and it can generate trade disputes in 
equilibrium.  Imperfect observability generating temporary suspensions of cooperation was first analyzed 
in the context of colluding firms by Green and Porter (1984) and generalized by Abreu et al (1990).  In 
our framework, whenever the producer price falls below a certain level it triggers a trade dispute and a 
temporary withdrawal of concessions.
7  The most important aspect of the noise in our framework is its 
correlation across sectors.  If it is not perfectly correlated across sectors, then disputes spill over to other 
linked sectors and cross retaliation causes each sector to suffer more trade disputes than if it was unlinked.  
On the other hand, if this noise is perfectly correlated across sectors, then although disputes spill over 
across sectors each sector would be in a dispute at the same time whether or not they were linked.  Hence, 
perfectly correlated noise does not impede the potential for static and incremental linking.  As the 
correlation decreases, however, both types of linking generate an increasing number of trade disputes.  If 
the noise is not perfectly correlated, then there will also be more disputes when the number of sectors 
already covered by the agreement is large.  To avoid potential cross retaliation, additional sectors may 
only be able to enforce free trade through unlinked agreements.  Unlinked side agreements are, therefore, 
predicted to be more prevalent in mature agreements.    
                                                      
6 Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Das et al. (2007) provide evidence of these costs for Columbia.  Evidence for 
France is provided by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2006).  These costs are related to the theories of export 
hysteresis developed by Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989), and, more recently, by Alessandria et al. 
(2008). 
7 Hungerford (1991), Riezman (1991), and Maggi (1999) also consider imperfect observability of trade barriers that 
could generate trade wars in equilibrium.  More recent work by Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Park (2006), Lee 
(2007), and Martin and Vergote (2007) consider trade disputes in equilibrium arising in frameworks with private 
information about domestic concerns, political pressure, and the observability of trade barriers.  The focuses of these 
papers are different and they do not consider the incremental addition of more sectors.   4 
 
  Our model generates three interesting empirical predictions about the types of sectors that are 
most likely to pursue trade liberalization through unlinked agreements.  Sectors that have stable demand 
and more easily observable trade related policies would suffer fewer disputes in an unlinked agreement, 
and would benefit less from being linked to a mature agreement with many disputes.  In addition, sectors 
whose noise is less correlated with that in the existing agreement would be most likely to pursue unlinked 
agreements.  Third, it predicts that we will see more zero-for-zero agreements as time progresses.  It is 
interesting to note that all of these conditions would seem to be met for the information technology and 
pharmaceutical zero-for-zero agreements.  Furthermore, our model suggests that countries may choose 
unlinked liberalization in certain groups by the use of selective preferential trading arrangements.   
  Recent work by Ederington (2001, 2003), Conconi and Perroni (2002), and Limao (2005) analyze 
the costs and benefits of linking trade policy and non-trade objectives.  Whereas these authors are 
concerned with the relationships between the objectives (Limao, for example, shows that optimal linking 
depends on whether the trade and non-trade objective are strategic complements or substitutes) we are 
concerned with the relationship between each sector’s noise.  We assume that the traded sectors are 
independent (and that some of them have slack enforcement capability at free trade) so that we can 
concentrate on the effect of noisy observability.  Although we only analyze differing production sectors it 
should be possible to extend our model to non-trade objectives and in this way our model, by focusing on 
observability, can be considered complementary to these other papers.
8  Ederington (2002) explicitly 
considers noisy observability in linking trade and environmental policy.  In his paper (as in this one), 
linking can be detrimental if countries make type 1 errors and incorrectly observe cheating, however, he 
shows that linking can be useful if countries make type 2 errors and fail to detect cheating.  Our paper 
differs from Ederington (2002) in several respects.  Trade partner specificity allows us to consider a 
gradual or incremental increase in the number of covered sectors and it is this large number of sectors that 
generates more (uncorrelated) observational errors so that eventually they overshadow the trade partner 
                                                      
8 One conclusion from our paper is that linking can be detrimental if the trade policy and non-trade objective have 
uncorrelated observation noise or if one of the two is much noisier than the other.  On the other hand, if their noise is 
perfectly correlated, then noise presents no limitations to linking.  For example, it is probably imprudent to link 
nuclear war to dumping in trade agreements, however, if the noise is perfectly correlated so that every time a nuclear 
attack is mistakenly observed dumping is also mistakenly observed, then linking would not make things any worse.   5 
 
specificity and make linking undesirable.  In addition to considering many linked sectors we also 
specifically consider the correlation between the observational errors.  Furthermore, we consider 
temporary punishment stages and dispute resolution as opposed to infinite grim reversion to the one-shot 
Nash equilibrium.   
  In addition to Ederington (2002), there is also a recent literature that considers the limitations of 
multimarket contact in other frameworks.  Thomas and Willig (2006) show that in the case of a noisy 
prisoners’ dilemma the BW multimarket result may lead to contagion and a worse outcome than not 
linking.  Matsushima (2001) shows that if there is a very large number of other markets and players use 
information from these other markets, then it should be possible to minimize erroneous observations of 
cheating so that linking is not detrimental.  This result suggests a role for information gathering and a 
direction for dispute adjudication in the WTOs dispute settlement board.  Still, the current reality is that 
disputes are currently decided on their own merits (which is in accordance with most national legal 
systems) and we abstract from the possibility of collective inference in this paper.   
  This paper is also related to the literature on the hold-up problem in international trade and that 
on trade agreements.  Lapan (1988) was the first to recognize that the optimal tariff after production has 
occurred is greater than the ex-ante optimal tariff.  In McLaren (1997), production precedes a trade 
agreement and, because governments can give side payments, agents do not internalize the erosion in 
national bargaining power caused by their actions.  Hence, if free trade is expected, then factors will 
accumulate in the export sector generating a very large optimal tariff that could be levied against this 
country.  In this case, the resulting side payment in the trade agreement may be so large as to leave the 
country worse off under an optimistic expectation of free trade than under an expectation of a trade war.  
Chisik (2003) does not allow for side payments as in McLaren (1997) and shows that this can cause 
countries to liberalize slowly, however, as the export capacity is developed over time countries become 
more integrated and trade barriers are gradually eroded.  Hence, in the Chisik (2003) case the hold-up 
problem is gradually mitigated by successful past liberalizations.   
  Past liberalizations generating a gradual reduction in trade barriers through the evolution of an 
endogenously determined state variable is also demonstrated by Staiger (1995), Devereux (1997), and 6 
 
Furusawa and Lai (1998).  Alternative explanations for the gradual reduction of trade barriers are 
provided by Bond and Park (2002), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (2007) and Zissimos (2007).  Whereas 
these previous papers all consider reduced trade barriers in one sector,  Baldwin (2006) shows how the 
creation and destruction of lobbyists can generate the gradual inclusion of additional sectors.  Multi-sector 
gradualism is also analyzed by Onder (2009) who shows how incomplete information and learning causes 
countries to start slow and then eventually add more sectors to the trade agreement.  None of these other 
authors consider eventual limitations to gradualism, which is the main focus of this paper.   
  In the next section of the paper we describe our framework in a noiseless environment and 
establish the possibility of incremental linking.  The third section shows the limitations of incremental 
linking in a noisy world.  The fourth section considers some extensions of the model and the fifth section 
contains our conclusions. 
2.  Incremental Linking with Perfectly Observable Trade Policies 
The Economic Environment 
  We start by considering a perfect information version of a model of trade and production between 
two countries.  The home and foreign countries are indexed by i œ {h, f} and can each produce Ni goods 
for export as well as a numeraire good that can be used to rectify trade imbalances.  Foreign has a value of 
αhj for one unit of each home good hj that is exported.  Home can choose to produce up to one unit of the 
good for export at a per-period unit cost of βhj.  The gains from trade on each good exported by home are 
denoted as hj = αhj – βhj.  Similarly, the gains from trade on each foreign export are fj = αfj – βfj.  Each 
country chooses tariffs to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that sums the producer surplus on 
each export good and the consumer surplus and tariff revenue on each import good.   
  Countries negotiate tariffs on each of the possible goods and firms choose which of the possible 
goods they wish to produce for export.  The only restriction is that past production decisions constrain 
current output levels.  If a good ij is produced in a previous period, then, at least ij œ [0, 1] of a unit must 
be produced in the current period.  We call ij as the measure of irreversibility.    7 
 
  The timing of the model is straightforward.  In the first stage of each period the two governments 
decide on which goods they are going to liberalize trade.  In the second stage exporting firms and 
importing consumers (or their agents) negotiate prices for each of the traded goods.  This negotiation is 
performed through a standard bargaining solution with equal bargaining weights on exporters and 
importers.
9  The outcomes of the first two stages are perfectly observed by the firms in both countries.  In 
the third stage governments are able to convey privately to their own firms whether or not they plan to 
abide by the agreement.  In the fourth stage, firms choose to produce up to one unit of good ij, subject to 
the irreversibility condition that if past output was positive, then the current output must be at least ij.  
We assume that the export and domestic markets are segmented so that trade and trade policy have no 
effect on the domestic market.  Hence we only consider export decisions.  The production decisions are 
observed by both governments who choose tariffs in the fifth stage. 
  In the absence of tariffs, the standard bargaining solution with equal weights on the exporters and 
importers would equally split the gains from trade.  In this case, the price of each good exported by 
country i would be Pij = (αij + βij)/2, and consumer and producer surplus on each good exported by 
country  i  would both be equal to ij/2.  Tariffs can serve to transfer surplus between producers, 
consumers, and governments and ij is the import tariff levied on good ij.  The standard bargaining 
solution also splits the payment of any planned cooperative tariff between the exporters and the importers 
so that the producer price is Pij = (αij + βij − ij)/2 and producer and consumer surplus are (ij − ij)/2.  In 
this case the tariff revenue from good ij is equal to ij.
10 
  Instead of the planned cooperative tariffs it is possible that there will be surprise tariffs by the 
importing country in the fifth stage of the period.  Because markets are segmented, and because tariffs are 
levied after production takes place, the unilaterally optimal, myopic tariff choice would expropriate the 
                                                      
9 All of the results in our model would obtain in a more traditional framework with un-segmented markets, 
increasing opportunity costs of production, and a diminishing rate of marginal substitution in consumption.  
Irreversibility is the one novel part of the model and it is our key assumption.  The presence of irreversibility, 
especially when considered with many goods, as well as imperfect observability and repeated interactions, renders 
the model more complex, and for that reason we chose the simplest possible formulation of supply and demand.  For 
an example of irreversibility in a more traditional framework see Chisik (2003, 2009).  
10 Our results are not at all dependant on the split of the gains from trade or the payment of the tariffs.  As long as 
the producer receives some of the surplus and has to pay at least some of the tariff all of our results would go 
through.  8 
 
entire value of output.  Put another way, once the exporting firm has sunk the production cost the static 
Nash-equilibrium tariffs only transfer surplus from the producers to the importing country.  Hence, the 
unilaterally optimal tariff is the largest one that leaves the exporters indifferent between exporting and 
throwing their goods in the ocean.  In this case the producer price Pij is zero, the static Nash-equilibrium 
tariff 
n
ij = αij, government revenue is equal to ij, and consumer surplus is zero.  The producer surplus is 
given by the already sunk production cost of − ij.
11   
  In the fourth stage of the period firms decide how many goods to produce for export.  The 
number of goods j that firms in country i will produce will be seen to be determined by their expectation 
of the tariffs, the number of goods previously produced, the gains from trade, and the measure of 
irreversibility.  This measure, ij, also directly affects future production decisions.  In particular, in any 
period firms can choose to produce one unit of good ij for export.  The restriction is that once a good is 
produced for export they are constrained to produce at least ij  1 unit of the good in all future periods.
12 
  The production irreversibility is perhaps best described as the need to maintain sales and 
infrastructure in the importing country.
13  Some of these expenses are sunk at the time of export 
expansion; however, many are also ongoing costs whose irreversibility stems from explicit contracts 
(such as advertising, brand name and sales infrastructure maintenance) and implicit contracts (such as 
maintaining networks and political favor).  Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Das et al. (2007) provide 
evidence that, for Colombian firms, these costs are an important component of the decision to enter an 
export market.  In this case  reflects the percentage of infrastructure that needs to be maintained even 
                                                      
11 We could also adopt the approach that because these surprise tariffs are not planned for in the negotiated price, the 
producer pays the entire tariff.  In this case the largest tariff that would leave the exporters indifferent between  
exporting and not, is (αij + βij)/2 so that the producer price is still zero and consumer surplus is (αij – βij)/2 as before.  
Given our utilitarian social welfare function the sum of consumer surplus and government revenue would still equal 
αij and producer surplus would still equal − ij.   
12 Firms could also choose to produce ij of a unit in the initial period, however, if it is optimal to produce, then it 
will be optimal to produce the entire unit.  It would be interesting to consider the possibility that firms could reduce 
output to ij of the previous level in each future period so that during long trade disputes production would 
eventually approach zero.  Although more realistic, this formulation would not change our results.  Furthermore, 
when we introduce noise and randomly occurring trade disputes in a subsequent section we need to rely on the 
recursive formulation of the model in order to solve it.  Hence, we preserve the recursive formulation from the outset 
of our presentation.  Although each exporting industry’s output is fixed to two levels we still consider an evolving 
state given by the number of industries that export. 
13 Alternatively, firms may have implicit contractual obligations with their workers or input suppliers arising from 
efficiency wage arrangements or explicit contractual obligations arising, for example, from union contracts.   9 
 
during a period of lower profitability.  We can then think of βij as the sales and infrastructure cost in every 
period and the marginal production cost is normalized to zero.  Irreversibility may also arise from the 
need to fit exports to the standards of the importing country (see, for example, Chen and Mattoo, 2006).  
It may also be interpreted as reflecting the reduced price that would be received if the exporter was forced 
to sell the goods on the world market at less preferential terms than those available in the PTA.   
  The third stage allows for communication between the government and the firms in their own 
country.  An assumption about this stage is necessary because there are, in effect, two decision makers in 
each country.  That is, if the government plans to deviate from the cooperatively chosen tariffs, we 
assume that this deviation is anticipated by the domestic firms.  This assumption is made because 
domestic firms have a better sense of the political pressures facing their own government and, therefore, 
are better able to anticipate when the agreement would be abrogated by deviating tariffs.  In this way 
firms and the government are making a coordinated decision on two variables (tariffs and output) when 
considering a deviation.   
  The first stage allows governments to announce cooperative tariffs.  When considering the 
constraints that arise in future stages, governments will also be able to affect the number of goods that are 
covered by the agreement.  That is, in addition to altering the depth of the agreement by the choice of 
tariffs, governments will also be able to adjust the breadth of the agreement or the number of goods that 
are covered.  It will be the combination of the depth and the breadth that will contribute to the overall 
level of integration between the countries.  
  In a sense we can think of this framework as describing a variation on an infinitely repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma.  Each pair of an import and an export good yields one prisoners’ dilemma and the 
collection of possibly traded pairs of goods yield many such dilemmas.  Within each pair, the production 
irreversibility indicates that the first period game will look different than the subsequent subgames.   
The Trade agreement 
  To make matters concrete we start by considering the current and continuation payoffs that are 
generated by tariff choices in the goods that both home and foreign designate as group 1.   10 
 
  For the home country, adhering to the agreement yields consumer surplus of (f1  −  f1)/2, 
producer surplus of (h1 − h1)/2, and government revenue f1.  Note that we use the good’s country of 
origin in designating all variables, including tariffs.  In addition, because we do not consider export 
policies, it is understood that f1 is the home per-unit tariff in period t on the foreign group 1 export.  




h V  = f1/2 +h1/2 + f1/2 − h1/ 2 .          ( 2 . 1 )  
  A deviation by the home country in the first period of liberalization in group 1 is given by the 
Nash-tariff  1 
n
f = αf1.  Consumer surplus is zero and government revenue is αf1.  Having anticipated their 
government’s deviation home firms would not produce group 1 for export and producer surplus would 
then be zero.  The deviation payoff in period 1 would then be:   
  11
d
h V  = αf1.            ( 2 . 2 )  
After a home country deviation a credible punishment stage would be where both countries levy Nash-
tariffs.  Of course, if home never produces, then foreign would never gain any tariff revenue.  On the 
other hand foreign would reduce output as much as possible, or to f1.  In this case, home’s expected per-
period payoff in the continuation game triggered by their first period deviation is: 
  11
n
h V  = f1αf1.            ( 2 . 3 )  
  Note that a deviation in a later period (t > 1), after home has committed to group 1 production, 
yields deviation and continuation payoffs of 
1
d
ht V  = αf1 + h1/2 − h1/2 and 
1
n
ht V  = f1αf1 – h1βh1.
14  A 
similar set of conditions can be written for the foreign country. 
  Although reversion to the static Nash-equilibrium tariffs may be credible it is not renegotiation 
proof in this framework.
15  We will consider more groups of goods being added to the trade agreement in 
                                                      
14 If both countries planned on deviating in the first period of the agreement, then no firms would ever plan on 
exporting and welfare in each country would be zero.  This static Nash-equilibrium outcome is what would appear 
as a possible continuation if this game was formulated as a standard prisoners’ dilemma.  The irreversibility 
condition implies that this static Nash-equilibrium is not obtainable if one country deviates and cannot be used as an 
enforcement threat here.  On the other hand, this static Nash-equilibrium outcome is the only outcome that is 
possible if countries cannot use history dependant strategies.  As this outcome is clearly inefficient countries we will 
examine enforceable Pareto superior outcomes.   
15 For more on renegotiation in repeated games see Bernheim and Ray (1989), Farrell and Maskin (1989), and Van 
Damme (1989).  International tariff setting games that employ renegotiation-proof strategies are analyzed by 
Ludema (2001) and Limão and Saggi (2008).  11 
 
each successive period, therefore, the possibility of renegotiating punishments after a deviation should be 
addressed.  We adopt Klimenko, Ramey, and Watson’s (2008) idea of recurrent trade agreements to our 
framework.
16  The idea is that countries agree to allow disputes to be settled by a third party that acts with 
some delay.  By turning dispute settlement over to a third party countries effectively tie their hands with 
respect to renegotiation.  When a dispute flares up, both countries simultaneously suspend previously 
granted concessions and enter a trade war phase.  In the trade war both countries act in their own short-
term self-interest, knowing that their actions will be ignored once the dispute is settled.  Hence, both 
countries levy Nash tariffs.  For countries to be willing to forego the possibility of renegotiation the 
dispute must be finite.  The recurrent trade agreement strategies of Klimenko et al. are not developed for 
the non-symmetric case or for the imperfectly observable tariffs that we consider here, therefore, our trade 
agreement strategies, should be considered as being in the spirit of their proposed recurrent trade 
agreement strategies.  As is easily verified, our trade agreement strategies are sub-game perfect.  Dispute 
resolution is, therefore, a delay in re-administering previously allowed concessions.  If the countries are in 
a trade dispute in period t, then the probability that the dispute settlement is effective and they resolve the 
dispute by period t+1 is given by  so that with probability (1−) the countries remain in a trade dispute 
in the following period.
17   
  We start by describing the supergame payoff functions for group j when countries abide by the 
trade agreement strategies.  Given the trade agreement strategies, cooperating yields an expected current 
and continuation payoff of 
c
ij G =  c
ij V +  
c
ij G .  The common factor with which both countries discount 
future payoffs is δ.  Solving for 
c
ij G  yields:           
 
c
ij G = /( 1 )
c
ij V     .           ( 2 . 4 )   
 A deviation yields  d
ij V + 
w
ij G .  The value of the withdrawal of concession stage,  w
ij G , also affords a 
recursive representation and is given by w
ij G = n
ij V +(π
c
ij G +(1–π) w
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.          (2.5)   
                                                      
16 As the focus of the paper is linking it is important to note that all of our results on static and incremental linking 
would still obtain if we utilized renegotiation proof strategies.  Recurrent trade agreement strategies allow for a 
clearer presentation notation and a seamless transition from the noiseless to the noisy case.   
17 We could also allow for finite and knowable delays so that the dispute is settled after T periods. 12 
 
The home country’s expected period 1 gain from deviating from the group 1 trade agreement is given by: 
  Ψh11 = 
11
d
h V  – 
11
c
h V  = αf1 – f1/2 – h1/2 – f11/2 + h11/ 2 .       ( 2 . 6 )  
The expected future cost triggered by the period 1 deviation is:  
  Ωh11=   δ 11 ()
cw











   
[f1/2 + h1/2 + f1t/2 – h1t/2 – f1αf1] (2.7) 






h V  + 
1
c
f V ).  Given the simple structure of the model non-prohibitive tariffs enter linearly and, after 
the export decision has been sunk, have no effect on overall welfare along the cooperative path, as long as 
they are low enough to permit trade.  If the social function was modified to include a weight on firm 
profits that took any value greater than unity, then each country would strictly prefer lower tariffs on its 
export goods.  We, therefore, look for the lowest tariffs that satisfy the incentive constraints that neither 
country wishes to deviate from the trade agreement: 
  Ψi11  Ωi11, i œ {h, f} .             ( 2 . 8 )  
  The first thing to notice about the incentive constraints is that they cannot both be satisfied at free 
trade if f1 = h1 = 1.  We state this as Result 1. 
Result 1:  If f1 = h1 = 1, then free trade is not self-enforcing for group 1 for both countries.   
  All proofs are contained in the appendix.  Result 1 is reminiscent of Mayer’s (1984) 
demonstration that free trade may not lie in the core.  In the present case, however, it is potential gains 
from trade and irreversibility that cause a country to become like the “small” country in Mayer’s analysis.  
It is to be expected that irreversibility, or trade partner specificity, reduces a countries bargaining power.  
On the other hand, it is of interest to note that export goods that provide more gains from trade can also 
make a country “small” or less powerful when it is combined with irreversibility.   
  Even when free trade is not self enforcing some level of tariff cooperation is possible as long as 
the measures of irreversibility are not too high.
18  In this case, the trade agreement will select the lowest 
                                                       
18 It is straightforward to construct critical discount factors that permit some tariff reductions as well as permit free 
trade to be immediately self enforcing.  These discount factors are functions of the parameters of the model and 
especially the measure of irreversibility.  For any measure of irreversibility the necessary free trade discount factor 
is larger than the discount factor that permits some tariff reductions. 13 
 
tariffs that are self-enforcing for each country.  What is interesting here is that it will be possible to 
improve on these initial tariff reductions in later periods.  This gradual reduction is possible because the 
firms’ initial irreversible investment changes the costs and benefits of adhering to the agreement.  The 
incentive constraint becomes slack and this permits lower tariffs.  We develop this idea in Result 2. 
Result 2:  An initial self-enforcing cooperative tariff of  1
c
i   > 0 can drop in a later period.  This drop is 
more likely if country i’s exports are more costly, if their production is more irreversible, or they ascribe 
a higher value to future payoffs. 
  Result 2 may be useful in explaining gradual tariff reductions that are evidenced in successive 
rounds of negotiations.  In the same way it may also explain the gradual tariff reductions that are written 
into the original agreement.  Alternatively, result 2 suggests that even in the absence of future 
negotiations countries would wish to lower tariffs; therefore, it suggests a rationale for why many 
observed tariffs are less than their bound level.  
Static Linking 
  We now allow countries to include more groups of goods in the original agreement.  The idea 
here is that the enforcement capacity on one group of goods may generate tariff liberalization in another 
group of goods.  Our first result in this section, however, is a non-result that is similar to the irrelevance 
result of BW.  If all of the tariffs are chosen so that each of the incentive constraints is just binding in the 
absence of linking, then there is no benefit from linking.  Although the deviation cost would increase, the 
benefit of deviation would increase as well because it would now be advantageous to deviate 
simultaneously in all markets.  The aggregated benefit, therefore, would then still be just equal to the 
aggregated cost.  Hence, if each constraint is just binding separately, then there is no benefit from linking 
them.  Put another way, linking agreements can only increase enforcement capacity and allow for tariff 
liberalization in a larger group of goods if tariffs are not set at their lowest possible level.   
Result 3:  If all tariffs are set at the lowest possible self-enforcing level, then there is no benefit from 
linking agreements on different groups of goods.   14 
 
  We now consider the possibility of linking trade agreements when the incentive constraints are 
not all binding.  One rationale for agreements such as these is that countries negotiate tariff reductions at 
an across the board rate.  We follow this idea and assume that this rate is zero.  That is, from this point on 
in the paper, tariff liberalization will imply free trade.
19  Note that for free trade to be self enforcing for at 
least one group implies, from result 1, that the extent of irreversibility is not too close to unity.  In 
proposition 1 we show that linking groups of goods can generate a greater level of tariff liberalization.  In 
particular, we show that if free trade is not enforceable for one group of goods and it is enforceable with a 
slack constraint for another group, then it is possible that it is enforceable for both together.  We then 
generalize this result to an arbitrary number of goods. 
Proposition 1:  Linking groups of goods in a trade agreement, so that a deviation can be punished by 
retaliation in all linked groups, can permit tariff liberalization in a larger set of goods.   
  With a few small changes it is easy to extend proposition 1 to the case when liberalized tariffs are 
positive, but still uniform.  Additionally, it is straightforward to show that, for any arbitrary number of 
goods, the lowest uniform tariff that can be enforced if the goods are not linked is greater than the lowest 
uniform tariff that is self-enforcing when the goods are linked.  This occurs because linking with the 
goods that could enforce lower tariffs and “borrowing” their slack enforcement capability permits a 
greater degree of tariff reductions in the remaining goods.  Proposition 1 and its extensions are not 
surprising.  They are merely an adaptation of BW to our tariff setting framework.   
  A more novel extension is suggested by the dynamic effect that is highlighted in result 2.   
Together with proposition 1, it suggests a dynamic interplay between the number of goods that are 
covered and the depth of liberalization on each good.  We build on the idea that past successful 
liberalizations introduce more slack in the incentive constraints and we consider the possibility that this 
slack could be taken up by the gradual inclusion of more goods in the agreement.  
                                                       
19 Our results would obtain with any other uniform tariff choice, but zero tariffs simplify the presentation in two 
respects.  First, zero tariffs un-clutter the notation.  Second, if liberalization implies free trade than there is no 
possibility for further reductions for each group as in result 2.  Hence, the cost of deviating is stationary for each 
group although, as will be seen, the number of groups may increase over time.   15 
 
Incremental Linking 
  We now consider how the incentive constraint changes when other groups are to be potentially 
added to the agreement.  We start by assuming that future negotiations are not anticipated in the current 
period.  In this case deviations and trade disputes have no effect on the possibility of future groups being 
added to the agreement.  We start in this way to demonstrate our results in a framework that is as simple 
as possible.  In section 4 we consider the alternative idea, that current deviations and disputes affect the 
possibility of further liberalization.  We show there that all of our results hold in that case subject to some 
interesting conditions, however, the added complication does generate some additional insights.   
  In some period after the period 1 costs are sunk, it will be possible to add group 2.  We refer to 
this period as T2 and we denote it as 2 when used as a time subscript to economize on notation.  The gain 
to deviating to the agreement in period T2 when the group 2 goods are to be added is: 
  Ψh22 = αf1 – f1/2 – h1/2 – ρf1βf1 + αf2 – f2/2 – h2/ 2 .       ( 2 . 9 )  
Note that a deviation in the new group will attract immediate retaliation in the existing group 1, therefore, 
the deviating home country would reduce output in group 1.  The incremental change to the gain from 
deviating from the agreement is:   
  Ψh22 – Ψh11 = αf2 – f2/2 – h2/2 – ρf1βf1.         ( 2 . 1 0 )  
More generally, the gain from deviating in any period TJ when the group J goods would be added to the 
agreement is: 




fjf j h j f j j   

   ] + [αfJ – fJ/2 – hJ/ 2 ] .        ( 2 . 1 1 )    
The incremental gain is given as: 
  ΨhJJ – Ψh(J-1)(J-1) = αfJ – fJ/2 – hJ/2 – ρf(J-1)βf(J-1).        ( 2 . 1 2 )  
As shown in the appendix, the marginal gain to deviating in the incremental linking case is lower than in 
the static linking case by the amount of the increased irreversible sunk cost committed to in the previous 
period: ρf(J-1)βf(J-1).   
  Now consider the cost of deviating from the agreement.  If another group is to be added to the 
agreement in period T2, then home’s cost of deviating is: 
  Ωh22 =  1( 1)

  [f1/2 + h1/2 – f1αf1 + h1βh1 + f2/2 + h2/2 – f2αf2].      (2.13) 16 
 
The incremental change in the cost of deviating is: 
  Ωh22 – Ωh11 =  1( 1)

  [f2/2 + h2/2 + h1βh1 – f2αf2] .         ( 2 . 1 4 )    
More generally, the cost of deviating from the agreement in any period TJ is: 






fjh j f j f j h j h j jj     

   ] .          ( 2 . 1 5 )    
The incremental gain is given as: 
  ΩhJJ – Ωh(J-1)(J-1) =  1( 1)

  [fJ/2 + hJ/2 + h(J-1)βh(J-1) – fJαfJ] .      ( 2 . 1 6 )  
  In the appendix we demonstrate that the cost to deviating in the incremental case is greater than in 
the static case by the discounted value of the added irreversible sunk cost  1( 1)

  h(J-1)βh(J-1).   
  We are now ready to state our first important result which shows that that more groups can be 
added to the agreement over time.  We proceed in two steps.  First we show that past liberalizations 
introduce slack in the incentive constraint and that this slack allows other groups to be linked.  Second, 
we show that it would have been impossible to link these goods in a static sense and that free trade would 
not have been enforceable for these goods by themselves.  The key to all of these conditions being 
satisfied is that the production costs and their level of irreversibility are sufficiently high.   
Proposition 2:  Incremental linking can add more groups of goods to the trade agreement than static 
linking.  If there exist groups for which free trade cannot be enforced by themselves or if included in the 
initial trade agreement, then it may become possible to include these groups in later periods.  These new 
additions in turn permit more groups to be added over time.  The ability to incrementally add more 
groups is increasing in the previous groups measures of irreversibility and their sunk costs, the gains 
from trade of the current group, and the discount factor; it is decreasing in the speed of dispute 
resolution, and in the cost of the current group.   
  Proposition 2 highlights the effect of the previously sunk irreversible costs on generating further 
tariff liberalization.  The effect of the gains from trade is the same in both cases.  It is the trade-partner 
specificity that uniquely distinguishes the static and incremental linking cases.  In turn, the irreversible 
trade-partner specific costs magnify the effect of the discount factor and the speed of dispute resolution on 
permitting more incremental linking.   17 
 
  It is interesting to compare the contrasting effect of irreversibility as seen in proposition 2 versus 
that seen in result 1 and proposition 1.  On the one hand, proposition 2 shows that these irreversibilities 
generate more incremental linking.  On the other hand, result 1 and proposition 1 show that more 
irreversibility reduces the ability to initiate trade liberalization.  We state these two conflicting effects of 
irreversibility together in corollary 1.   
Corollary 1:  More irreversibility makes it harder to enforce free trade in any one group or any 
collection of linked groups, however, it makes it easier to link more groups over time.   
  Proposition 2 shows that the scope of trade liberalization can increase over time.  An alternative 
possibility is that an initially modest level of tariff liberalization (less than the lowest self-enforcing level) 
generates an initially broad agreement that encompasses many goods but that is shallow, with small tariff 
cuts.  By result 2, non-zero tariffs could drop over time, and they may drop more if more goods are 
included in the agreement in the initial period   It is of some interest to consider whether initially deep 
liberalization that is narrowly confined to a few goods, or initially broad but shallow liberalization will 
eventually generate the greatest level of overall trade liberalization.  We leave this question for further 
research.  Instead we add imperfect observability to our model in order to analyze why this incremental 
liberalization may stop growing and why countries may want to choose to make unlinked agreements.   
3.  Trade Disputes and Limited Incremental Linking. 
Imperfectly Observable Trade Policies 
We now include para-tariffs, indirect taxes and the tariff equivalent of these and other non-tariff barriers 
in our analysis.  Although countries negotiate over these trade restrictions they are not perfectly 
observable and countries cannot be certain of their partner’s compliance.  We think of the trade agreement 
as being over the combined level of the observable and unobservable tariffs and in this way we can write 
τij as the combined tariff and we note that this tariff is not perfectly observable.  In addition to the 
imperfectly-observed tariffs, prices may be influenced by imperfectly-observed macroeconomic or 
preference fluctuations.  These fluctuations are represented by the random variables {εijt}, and reflect the 18 
 
noise inherent in observing a trade partner’s policy.  They are identically distributed mean zero random 
variables with cumulative distribution functions, F, that satisfy first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) 
and densities that are defined over the full support of the distribution.  The importer price for good ij is 
given by P-ij.  The producer price for good ij is then given by Pijt = P-ijt – τijt – εijt. 
  In this uncertain environment low prices arise from unobserved tariff deviations or from 
macroeconomic or preference fluctuations.  The imperfect tariff observability allows countries to deviate 
from the agreement and blame the stochastic element.  For this reason, sufficiently large downturns need 
to be treated as potential deviations that trigger retaliation.  Hence, we adapt our trade agreement 
strategies to also include a modification of the trigger strategies that were first introduced by Green and 
Porter (1984).  In particular, the trigger is  ij P   > 0 and the probability that the realization of the producer 
price Pijt is greater than or equal to the trigger value is:  
  Pr(   ) ijt ij PP    = Pr( –   ) ijt ijt ijt ij PP      =  (–  ) ijt ijt ij F PP      = φij(τijt).    (3.1) 
We use φij(τijt) to denote the cumulative probability that the producer price is greater than the trigger price 
conditional on the chosen combined observable and unobservable tariff barriers.  By the FOSD of F we 
have that the conditional distribution φij(τijt) satisfies FOSD as well so that φij(τijt) is decreasing in τijt.  We 
write the free trade cooperative case as φij(0) = 
c
ij  .  The joint probability that both the home and foreign 
producer prices are above their trigger value is written as: 
  Φj = Pr(   ,   ) hjt hj fjt fj PP PP    = Pr( ) hjt hj PP   ·Pr( | ) fjt fj hjt hj PP PP   .      (3.2) 
The conditional probability Pr( | ) fjt fj hjt hj PP PP    is bounded below by φfj(τfjt) if the fluctuations are 
independent and is bounded above by above by unity if they are perfectly correlated.  Hence, 
Pr( | ) fjt fj hjt hj PP PP    œ [φfj(τfjt), 1].  Using this fact establishes that φij(τijt) ≥ Φj ≥ φfj(τfjt)·φhj(τhjt), and the 
inequalities are strict unless the fluctuations are perfectly correlated.   
  In a similar manner we define the joint probability that the home and foreign producer prices are 
above their trigger values for groups 1 and 2 as: 
  Φ12 =  11 11 22 2 2 P r (  ,  ,  ,   ) h th f tf h th f tf PP PP PP PP     .       ( 3 . 3 )  
In a manner analogous to the paragraph after equation (3.2) it is straightforward to verify that: 19 
 
 min{Φ1, Φ2} ≥ Φ12 ≥ Φ1·Φ2 ≥ φf1(τf1t)·φh1(τh1t)·φf2(τf2t)·φh2(τh2t).     (3.4) 
Note that the inequalities are strict unless the fluctuations are perfectly correlated across groups and 
countries.  We write Φ1*J as the joint probability that the home and foreign producer prices are above their 
values for goods 1 through J and we will write Φ1J as the joint probability for groups 1 and J.  When the 
countries adhere to the free trade agreement, and choose zero tariffs, the probabilities that the producer 
prices are greater than their trigger values are given by 
c
j   = Φj(0) for the good j case and  1*
c
J  = Φ1*J(0) 
for the goods 1 through J case.  On the other hand, a deviating tariff of 
n
ij   reduces  j   from 
c
j  to 
()
d
j ij   =
id
j  , where 
id
j  is the probability that neither producer price triggers a trade war, given that 
country i chose a deviating tariff.  Similarly,  1*
c
J   is reduced to  1*
d
J    
  If groups 1 through J are covered by the agreement, then a dispute state is signaled in period t (to 
start in t+1) with probability 1  1*
c







j   =  1*
c
J   = 1.  Hence, we refer to 
c
j   and  1*
c
J   as measures of trade stability. 
  Adapting the trade agreement strategies to this uncertain environment is straightforward.  If the 
trade agreement has been adhered to in the past and no external shock in the previous period triggers a 
withdrawal of concession stage or if the countries are in a withdrawal of concession stage and the dispute 
is settled, then each country sets its current tariff according to the trade agreement.  After any other 
history they are in a withdrawal of concession stage awaiting a dispute settlement.  Firms have similar 
strategies.  If the countries are not in a dispute stage in period t and if there is no indication that either 
government intends to deviate from the treaty in the current period, then firms produce according to the 
expected tariff.   
Payoff Functions 
  We start by describing the supergame payoff functions for group j when countries abide by the 
trade agreement strategies.  The value of abiding by the agreement in some period t is given by:  
 
c
ij G =  c
ij V + (
cc
j ij G  + (1 –
c
j  )[ n
ij V + (π
c
ij G  + (1 – π)
 
w
ij G )]).     (3.5) 
The withdrawal of concession stage is the same as in the noiseless case: 
  w
ij G =  n
ij V   + (π
c
ij G  + (1 – π) w
ij G )         ( 3 . 6 )  
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    
.         (3.8) 
We write  = 
2 [1 (1 ) ( )]
cc
jj        =[1 ( )][1 ]
c
j       and we note that   (0, 1).   
It is straightforward to verify that in the absence of uncertainty, so that 
c
j  = 1, equations (3.7) and (3.8) 
are the same as (2.4) and (2.6).   
  Given the trade agreement strategies, cooperating yields an expected current and continuation 
payoff of  c
ij V + [
cc
j ij G  + (1 –
c
j  ) w
ij G ].  A deviation yields expected current and continuation payoffs of 
d
ij V + [
id c
j ij G  + (1 –
id
j  ) w
ij G ].  The one period gain from deviating on group j in period t is: 
  ijt   = 
dc
ij ij VV             ( 3 . 9 )  
This gain must be balanced against the cost of a future trade war: 






ij ij GG  = Δ(Φ, , δ)()
cn
ij ij VV        ( 3 . 1 0 )  











 > 0.  It is straightforward to verify that Δ is increasing in δ and in 
c
j  , 




j   is non-negative and non-decreasing in 
d
ij  .   
  We now consider how Δ(Φ, , δ) changes as more groups are added to the agreement.  First note 
that realized prices are bounded below by zero, therefore, the distributions, F, limit prices to be non-
negative.
20  A simple example of a distribution function that satisfies the above assumptions is where Pijt 
= P-ijt – τijt with probability χ and either 0 or 2Pijt each with probability (1 − χ)/2.  The expectation of Pijt is 
unbiased and the distribution φij(τijt) satisfies FOSD.  Note that any tariff greater than the trade agreement 
tariff yields an observed price below the cooperative price so that any price lower than this cooperative 
expected price triggers a trade war phase.  Note that in this case 
c
ij   = (1 + χ)/2.  If we consider one group 
in each country and assume that the fluctuations are uncorrelated, then when countries adhere to the trade 
agreement strategies a trade war will start in the next period with probability (3 – 2χ – 
2)/4.  If either 
                                                       
20 If we do not make this assumption, then we could employ the exporting firm’s ability to not sell their product at a 
negative price.  In this case, their expected price would be conditional on the price being greater than zero.  
Although the inclusion of a truncated distribution clutters the analysis, it does not change the results.  21 
 
country deviates a dispute is triggered with probability 1.  For this distribution deviations are revealed 
with probability one and sometimes cooperation is indistinguishable from a deviation.   
  We now analyze how  1*
c
J  – 1* 1
c
J  < 1*
id
J  – 1* 1
id
J   changes as more groups are added to the 
agreement.  For the distribution considered in the above paragraph we have that  1
c   =  (1 + χ)
2/4 and that 
1
id   = 0.  If J groups were linked, and if their fluctuations are uncorrelated, then  1*
c





J  = 0.  In this case,  1*
c
J  – 1* 1
c
J  < 1*
id
J  – 1* 1
id
J  = 0.  This inequality holds for any distribution, in the 




j   is sufficiently large.  More generally, as the following lemma 
shows, it must hold in the case of uncorrelated fluctuations as long as the number of linked groups is 
sufficiently large.   
Lemma 1:  If the stochastic fluctuations are independently and identically distributed among the groups, 
then there exists a  ˆ J  such that for all J ≥  ˆ J  it is true that 1*
c
J  – 1* 1
c
J  < 1*
id
J  – 1* 1
id
J  .  The critical 




j   and in the magnitude of the deviating 
tariff.  If deviations are revealed with probability one then as long as the fluctuations are not perfectly 
correlated  ˆ J  = 1. 




= 0 and that 
d
ij   is maximal.  From the 
second sentence of lemma 1, both of these push  ˆ J  to its minimal value, and as shown above,  ˆ J = 1.  
From lemma 1 we can derive sufficient conditions under which Δ(Φ, , δ)  is decreasing as more groups 
are added to the agreement and we do that in lemma 2. 
Lemma 2:  (i.)  If deviations are revealed with probability one and the stochastic fluctuations are not 
perfectly correlated, then Δ(Φ, , δ) is declining in the number of groups, J, added to the agreement.  (ii.)  
If the stochastic fluctuations are i.i.d., then there exists a  ˆ J J    such that for all J J   , Δ(Φ, , δ) is 
declining in J.   
Static Linking and Trade Disputes 
  As in the noiseless case we start by considering the incentive constraint for one group by itself.  
We then consider linking more groups at the same time and then over time.  For group j, for the home 
country in period 1 this implies  22 
 
  Ψhj1 = αfj – fj/2 – hj/2   [fj/2 + hj/2 – fjαfj] = Ωhj1        ( 3 . 1 1 ) .  
From equation (3.11) zero tariffs are self-enforcing if  
  δ ≥ 
2
(( 1 –) ) 2+ ( ) (+)
fj fj hj
ci d i d
j fj fj j fj j fj hj
 
    

   
= δhj.      ( 3 . 1 2 )  
There are several interesting things to notice about equation (3.12).  First, if 
c
j  =1 and
id
j  = 0, then  
δhj = [2αfj – fj – hj]/[2αfj(1 – f – π) + π(fj + hj)] as in the noiseless case.  Second, this critical discount 
factor is decreasing in 
c




j  > 0).  Furthermore, as long as hj is not 
too much larger than fj (or in the symmetric case where they are equal), then an increase in π generates 
an increase in the critical discount factor.  These partial derivatives indicate that greater trade stability, 
more easily reversible export decisions, and longer expected trade disputes (or less forgiving dispute 
settlement) make it is easier to enforce free trade. 
  We now consider the possibility of static linking in this noisy environment where trade disputes 
occur with probability one.  We first show that for two groups 1 and 2 taken separately it is possible that δ 
≥ δh2 > δh1, but taken together yield a discount factor δh12 > δ.  The key to this last part is that the 
probability of entering a trade dispute increases when the groups are linked.  On the one hand, if the 
stochastic fluctuations are perfectly correlated, then linking more groups in the trade agreement does not 
increase the probability of entering a trade dispute and a result similar to that in proposition 2 obtains for 
the noisy case.  On the other hand, as the correlation between the stochastic fluctuations drops, or the 
number of groups increases, the probability of entering a dispute increases and this in turn will decrease 
the benefit of linking the groups.   
Proposition 3:  If the stochastic fluctuations are perfectly correlated, then linking groups of goods in a 
trade agreement, so that a deviation can be punished by retaliation in all linked groups, can permit tariff 
liberalization in a larger set of goods.  If the stochastic fluctuations are not perfectly correlated, then 
there are groups of goods for which trade is self-enforcing separately but not when they are linked 
together in the trade agreement.  If the deviating tariffs are revealed with probability one, then as the 
correlation in the stochastic fluctuations decreases, linking can enforce free trade in fewer groups.  If the 
stochastic fluctuations are uncorrelated, then there exists a threshold number of groups (which may be as 23 
 
low as one) so that as the number of groups exceeds the threshold it becomes progressively harder to 
enforce free trade for all groups as more groups are added to the agreement.   
  Proposition 3 is important because it shows how the inclusion of noise can change the results of 
BW.  Whereas linking cannot be counterproductive in a deterministic environment, the possibility of 
entering a dispute even when no one deviated can limit the benefit of linking in a stochastic framework.  
Note that it is never disadvantageous for a noisy group when it is linked to a non-noisy group, however, 
the non-noisy group would suffer.  A more subtle point is that linking is only disadvantageous when the 
stochastic fluctuations are not perfectly correlated.  If they are perfectly correlated, then the same mistake 
would be made in both groups at the same time whether or not they are linked and, therefore, we are left 
only with the increased enforcement power of linking and do not suffer the increased dispute initiation 
effect.  In addition, note that as the correlation decreases, the increased dispute initiation effect becomes 
stronger.  In the deterministic BW model, linking becomes more productive as the groups are more 
different.  Noise works in the opposite direction.  As the correlations between the groups decreases, 
linking becomes more detrimental.  We state this point below as a corollary of Proposition 3.   
Corollary 2:  Noise operates in an opposite manner to all determinist differences which increase the 
benefit to linking as the difference between the groups increase.  The presence of noise does not limit the 
benefit of linking groups when the stochastic fluctuations are perfectly correlated across groups.  As the 
correlation decreases, so that the groups become more different in this respect, the benefit from linking 
decreases as well.   
  Up until now we have considered that the probability of successful dispute resolution is the same 
across groups and also that it is the same when the groups are linked.  We have no a priori expectation of 
how these may change, however, it is possible that for some reason that is external to the model πj ≠ πk.  
For example, group 2 may require quicker dispute settlement than group 1 (perhaps because group 2 
items are necessities and group 1 are luxury items).  From equation (3.12) and its multi-group counterpart 
in the appendix it is evident that a higher probability of dispute settlement makes it harder to enforce free 24 
 
trade (or any cooperative tariff level).  A potential problem, therefore, may arise if the probability of 
dispute settlement in the linked agreement has to correspond to the higher probability of group 2 so that π1 
< π2 = π12.  In this case it is again possible that δi1 < δi2 ≤ δ when taken separately, however, δi12 > δ when 
linked together.   
Incremental Linking and Trade Disputes. 
  As shown in the previous section, the introduction of noise can limit the number of goods that can 
be linked in the agreement in the initial period.  We now consider the effect of noise on incremental 
linking.  As in the deterministic case analyzed in Proposition 2, we abstract from the horizontal linkage 
issue and only consider one group to be added to the agreement in each period.  This assumption allows 
us to dispense with many summation symbols in the analysis and it is without loss of generality because 
we could consider each group as the composite of groups that are added in each period.
21   
  The gains from deviating from the agreement are the same as in equations (2.9) through (2.12).  
The home country’s period 1 cost to deviating from the period 1 agreement is:    
  Ωh11 = Δ(Φ1, , δ) 11 ()
cn
hh VV  = Δ(Φ1, , δ)[f1/2 + h1/2 – f1αf1] .      ( 3 . 1 4 )  
If a second group is to be added to the agreement in period T2, then the cost of deviating is: 
  Ωh22 = Δ(Φ12, , δ)[f1/2 + h1/2 – f1αf1 + h1βh1 + f2/2 + h2/2 – f2αf2].      (3.15) 
The incremental change in the cost of deviating is: 
  Ωh22 – Ωh11 = [Δ(Φ12, , δ) – Δ(Φ1, , δ)][f1/2 + h1/2 – f1αf1]   
   +   Δ(Φ12, , δ)[f2/2 + h2/2 + h1βh1 – f2αf2] .        ( 3 . 1 6 )    
More generally, the cost of deviating from the agreement in any period TJ where the group J goods would 
be added to the agreement is: 
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   ].        (3.17)   
The marginal change to the cost of deviating is: 
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21 Note that if we take this approach, then we can treat the αs, βs, and θs as averages, however, the ρs are not strictly 
averages because they need to be adjusted so that the composite product ρβ is equivalent to the original sum of the 
individual products.  As stressed above, and is the core of the paper, the joint probabilities Φjk are not averages.   25 
 
  +   Δ(Φ1*J, , δ)[fJ/2 + hJ/2 + h(J-1)βh(J-1) – fJαfJ] .       ( 3 . 1 8 )  
  The incremental cost to deviating has two additional terms as compared to the static linking case.  
First, there is the discounted value of the added irreversible sunk cost Δ(Φ1*J, , δ)h(J-1)βh(J-1).  This 
additional cost is comparable to the noiseless case, the difference is that the discount factor is Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) 
instead of  1( 1)

  .  Second is the change in the discount factor multiplied by the irreversible sunk costs 




hj hj j  

  ].  If the fluctuations are 
perfectly correlated, then this second term is zero.  If fluctuations are not perfectly correlated, then by 
lemma 2, this term is negative for J sufficiently high.   
  As in the noiseless case, the irreversible sunk costs can generate the ability to incrementally add 
more groups to the agreement over time that could not be linked in a static sense.  The incremental 
decrease in the gain from deviating is the same in either case.  The cost of deviating may be higher or 
lower, however, in the noisy case.  If the fluctuations are perfectly correlated, then the cost is lower in the 
noisy incremental linking case because Δ(Φ1*J,  ,  δ) <  1( 1)

  .  As the correlation between the 
fluctuations decrease, Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) is reduced.  Furthermore, from lemma 2, if the deviations are revealed 
with probability one, or if the fluctuations are uncorrelated, then [Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) – Δ(Φ1*J-1, , δ)] becomes 
negative as J increases.  Hence, as the correlations decrease there is less potential for incremental linking.  
In addition, as more groups are added to the agreement, Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) is reduced so that incremental 
linking becomes progressively more difficult over time.  These points are established formally in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4:  If the stochastic fluctuations are perfectly correlated, incremental linking may enforce 
free trade in more groups than static linking, however, fewer additional groups will be added in the noisy 
than in the noiseless case.  If the stochastic fluctuations are not perfectly correlated, and if the deviating 
tariffs are perfectly revealed, then free trade is enforced for fewer additional groups by incremental 
linking in the noisy case than in the noiseless case.  If the deviating tariffs are revealed with probability 
one, then as the correlation between the stochastic fluctuations decreases the level of incremental linking 
in the noisy case will fall further below the noiseless case.  If the deviations are revealed with probability 26 
 
one but the stochastic fluctuations are uncorrelated, then there exists a threshold number of groups,
ˆ J JJ    (which may be as low as one), so that if the number of groups exceeds the threshold there is 
less incremental linking in the noisy case than in the noiseless case.   
  Proposition 4 reinforces the idea that linking does not always enforce more cooperative outcomes 
when policies are observed with noise.  As in the case of static linking, the benefit to incremental linking 
is increasing in the trade stability measure and in the correlation of the stochastic fluctuations.  An 
unstable environment with uncorrelated shocks yields the smallest measure of incremental linking.   
  From the proof of proposition 4 it appears possible that noisy incremental linking could even 
enforce less cooperative outcomes than noisy static linking; however, this claim is not part of the 
proposition.  What we show in the proof to proposition 4 is that the cost to deviating in the noisy 
incremental linking case is falling in the number of groups previously added to the agreement.  We build 
on this idea in proposition 5 which is an immediate corollary of proposition 4. 
Proposition 5:  If the stochastic fluctuations are uncorrelated, or if the stochastic fluctuations are not 
perfectly correlated and the deviating tariffs are revealed with probability one, then it becomes 
progressively more difficult to incrementally link groups in the noisy as compared to the noiseless case.   
  Putting together propositions 3 through 5 it is evident that the process of incremental 
liberalization could stop even though there are groups of goods that would benefit from trade 
liberalization.  These may be new groups that were not anticipated when the agreement was originated or 
they may be established groups for which no agreement was previously reached.  Recognizing the benefit 
of liberalizing trade in these groups countries would want to include them in a trade agreement, however, 
they would prefer an agreement that is not linked to any previous agreement.  Examples of unlinked 
agreements that are signed by contracting parties to the GATT/WTO are the zero-for-zero agreements 
covering information technology, financial services, and pharmaceuticals as well as sectors covered in 
PTAs that are not covered in the WTO.  As we show in proposition 6 below these unlinked agreements 27 
 
should be more prevalent if there is more trade instability, if the agreement already contains many groups,  
or if the stochastic fluctuations are less correlated.   
Proposition 6:  If the measure of trade stability is lower, the stochastic fluctuations are less correlated, 
and/or the number of already covered groups is greater, then countries will not link liberalization in new 
groups and these new groups will be covered by unlinked agreements.   
  Proposition 6 predicts that we will see more zero-for-zero agreements as time progresses.  It also 
yields the empirical prediction that they would be more common for groups whose price fluctuations are 
less correlated with overall macroeconomic fluctuations.  It is interesting to note that both of these 
conditions would seem to be met for the information technology and pharmaceutical zero-for-zero 
agreements.  An additional implication of proposition 6 is that countries may choose unlinked 
liberalization in certain groups by the use of selective preferential trading arrangements.   
4.  Anticipated Incremental Linking 
Anticipatory Trade Agreement Strategies. 
  We now consider that future negotiations are anticipated by the participants in the trade 
agreement and we analyze the effects of disputes on the probability of adding other groups in subsequent 
periods.  It would be straightforward to derive conditions in the anticipatory case so that our previous 
results hold, however, it is more interesting to analyze how anticipatory strategies would strengthen and 
weaken the previous results. The sufficient conditions that ensure that all of the previous results obtain are 
clear from this analysis.  We then use the derivations behind this analysis to suggest further results.    
  We begin by noting that while they are engaged in a current dispute countries will never add 
additional groups by incremental linking that they could not add by static linking.  The intuition is 
straightforward.  The previously sunk irreversible trade partner specific costs are what permit incremental 
linking of groups for which static linking did not enforce free trade.  During a dispute the revenues to 
cover these costs are already sacrificed and there is nothing further to lose, therefore, they do not enter the 
deviation decision calculus.  Hence, countries need to wait for a trade dispute to end before they can 28 
 
consider incrementally adding additional groups.  Note as well that if countries can choose when to add 
an additional group, then they will want to do so as soon as possible.  After the irreversible investments 
have been made for group 1, countries will want to link group 2 in period 2 as long as they are not in a 
dispute in period 2.  If they are in a dispute, then they need to wait until the dispute is finished before 
incrementally linking group 2.   
  To fix ideas, start by assuming that there are only two possible groups.  If countries adhere to the 
cooperative path in period 1, and if it would be possible to add group 2 in the subsequent period, then the 
value of adhering to the agreement in period 1 is:   
  Γi1 = 1
c
i G + δ[ 1
ic  2
c
i G +(1– 1
ic  )[0+δ(π 2
c
i G +(1–π)[0+δ(π 2
c
i G +(1–π)[0+δ(π 2
c
i G +(1–π)··· 
 =  1
c
i G + δ 2
c
i G [ 1







 =  1
c
i G + δ 2
c
i G [ 1









  ]   
 =  1
c
i G + δ 2
c
i G [ 1
ic  +(1– 1
ic  )( 1( 1)

  ) ] .         ( 4 . 1 )  
  More generally, when there are many possible incremental linkages, we use Γij to denote the 
value of adhering to the agreement in the period when it is first possible to add group j.   Hence, for group 
1 in the many good case we have: 
  1
c
i  =  1
c
i G + δ 2
c
i  [ 1
ic  +(1– 1
ic  )( 1( 1)

  ) ] .       ( 4 . 2 )  
Similarly, for group J we can write: 
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In the noiseless case  1*
ic
J  = 1 and  (1 ) 1
J cL c cL
iJ ij i J j G         , where we use L to differentiate the noiseless 
case.  The value of the withdrawal of concession stage now can also be modified to include its effect on 
delaying liberalization in other groups.  For group 1 it is written as: 
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i  )          ( 4 . 4 )  
If dispute settlement is effective, then group 2 can be linked in the following period.  In the noiseless case 
we would write  2
cL
i   in place of  2
c
i  .  A withdrawal of concession stage triggered while there is free trade 
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  Given the anticipatory trade agreement strategies, cooperating in period TJ yields an expected 
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iJ  ].  The one period gain from 
deviating in the anticipatory (with superscript A) agreement in period TJ is the same as in sections 2 and 3: 
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Anticipatory strategies, therefore, only matter through their effect on the cost of the future trade war: 
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It is straightforward to verify that equation (4.7) is identical to (3.17) if no future groups are anticipated to 
be linked to the agreement.   
Anticipatory Trade Agreements Without Noise 
  In the absence of noise, equation (4.7) can be rewritten as:  
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The incremental change in the noiseless case is:  
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  The first expression in (4.9) is the same as (2.14) in the un-anticipatory case.  The second term is 
the change in the cost of deviating that occurs only in the anticipatory case.  The difference between  
incremental linking in the anticipatory and un-anticipatory cases depend on the signs of  (1 )
cc
iJ i J VV    and of 
δ(1 – δ)( (2 ) (1 )
cL cL
iJ iJ    ).  If each group has the same gains from trade, then  (1 )
cc
iJ i J VV   = 0.  Otherwise, it 
would generate more (less) incremental linking if  (1 ) ()
cc
iJ i J VV   .  This is reasonable:  If countries 
anticipate incrementally adding groups with more gains from trade than the present group, then it would 
raise the cost of a current deviation and permit more linking in the current period.   
  The second part of the second term δ(1 – δ) (2 ) (1 ) ()
cL cL
iJ iJ    can be rewritten as  
 δ(1 – δ)
1
(2 ) 1 [( 1 ) ]
J cL c
iJ i j j G 

     .  This second part depends on the number of groups already in the 
agreement and the potential number of groups to be added.  If more groups are already covered by the 
agreement, then it pushes this second part towards being negative.  More importantly, if there are fewer 30 
 
potential groups to be added to the agreement then it also pushes this part towards being negative.  This 
second part is similar to the first part – if the agreement is expected to grow in value in the future, then it 
would increase the current benefit to incremental linking.  Hence, there would be more or less incremental 
linking in the anticipatory case than in the un-anticipatory case depending on the expectation of the value 
of future linkages, the number of future linkages, and the number of current linkages.   
  The previous paragraph suggests a type of bicycle effect that could serve as an additional 
rationale for the rise of non-linked agreements.  If countries do not anticipate many more groups to be 
added to the agreement (that is, pretty soon no one will be pedaling the bicycle forward), then it becomes 
less possible to incrementally link some currently available groups to the agreement and countries may 
choose to liberalize trade in these groups by the use of unlinked agreements.   
Anticipatory Trade Agreements With Noise 
  We now return to the noisy case in anticipatory trade agreements.   Using equation (4.7) we see 
that the incremental change in the cost of deviating is: 
  (1 ) (1 )
AA
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The first two terms in (4.10) are the same as in the un-anticipatory case.  The final two terms are what 
distinguishes the anticipatory noisy case.   Note that if there is no noise, then they are the same as the 
second term in (4.9).  We begin our analysis of the noisy case by studying the case when the fluctuations 
are perfectly correlated so that (4.10) becomes: 
  (1 ) (1 )
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It is easy to compare (4.11) to the noiseless case as in (4.9).  In particular, the second line in (4.11) has 
roughly the same two terms.  The term (1 )
cc
iJ i J GG    adds (subtracts) from the benefit of incremental 
linking if the next linked group is expected to have more (less) gains from trade than the current group.  31 
 
Similarly, the sign of the expression  (2 ) (1 )
cc
iJ iJ      depends on how many groups are currently covered 
by the agreement and how many could be linked in the future.   Both of these terms are smaller than their 
noiseless case counterpart.  If 
cd  = 1, then the second line of (4.11) is the same as the second term 
of (4.9).  As the measure of trade stability,
c  , is reduced the second line falls below the second term in 
(4.9).  Hence, we see that noise reduces the benefit of incremental linking in the anticipatory case as well.   
  When the fluctuations are not perfectly correlated we begin by noting that 
1*( 1) 1* 1*( 1)
cc c
JJ J     .   If 
d
j  = 0, or (using lemma 1) if the fluctuations are uncorrelated and ˆ J J  , 
then  1* 1*
cd
J J  < 1*( 1) 1*( 1)
cd
JJ   as well.  Using these facts and examining the third and fourth line of 
(4.10)  shows that their difference is less than the case of perfectly correlated fluctuations as seen in 
(4.11).  Furthermore, as the correlation drops or as the number of groups increases the third minus the 
fourth line of (4.10) will also drop.  Hence, in the anticipatory, as in the un-anticipatory, case, noise 
reduces the benefit of incremental over static linking.  Furthermore, as the noise increases, the 
correlations between the fluctuations decreases, and/or the number of already linked groups increases, the 
potential for enforcing free trade in a group by an incremental link when it could not be enforced with a 
static link falls.  We have already seen that in the presence of noise static links may enforce less free trade 
than unlinked agreements so in the anticipatory case countries may again choose unlinked zero-for-zero 
agreements.  In the case of anticipatory strategies the number of groups becomes even more important 
and the number of remaining potential links turns out to be an important factor.  Finally note that the 
anticipatory case with noise also yields the previously mentioned bicycle effect that further generates the 
formation of unlinked agreements.   
5. Conclusion  
  We explain the broadened scope of the GATT/WTO through successive rounds of trade 
liberalization as a result of incremental linking.  In more recent years, however, countries have pursued 
trade liberalization through sector specific zero-for-zero agreements and preferential trade agreements, 
both of which have a reduced chance of suffering cross retaliation.  This increase in unlinked agreements 
is explained by imperfect observability of trade policies generating gratuitous trade disputes and 32 
 
unjustified cross retaliation.  If the dispute generating noise is perfectly correlated across sectors, 
however, then it provides no reason not to link agreements in a static sense and in many cases incremental  
linking still generates more liberalization than static linking.  It is only when the noise is imperfectly 
correlated that linking and cross retaliation are problematic so that some sectors can enforce more 
liberalization in an unlinked agreement.  If the correlation drops, the noise increases, or the number of 
sectors already covered is large, then incremental linking of more sectors is inefficient and countries 
pursue unlinked agreements.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Result 1:  First consider the symmetric case so that αf1 = αh1 = α1, βf1 = βh1 = β1, and f1 = h1 = 
ρ1.  In this case, the incentive constraints each require that  1( 1)

  (1 – 1α1)  α1 – 1.  Noting that ij  
αij for each good implies that this condition could not be satisfied when ρ1 = 1.  In the non-symmetric 
case, if country i’s group 1 goods generate less gains from trade so that i1 < -i1, then zero tariffs are not 
self enforcing for country i.Ñ   
Proof of Result 2:  Consider, without loss of generality, the home country.  From equations (2.6) and 
(2.7) we see that that Ψh11 is continuous and strictly decreasing in its import tariff, f1t, and that Ωh11 is 
continuous and strictly increasing in f1.  Hence, there exists a  1
c
f   such that Ψh11 = Ωh11 at  1
c
f   and Ψh11 > 
Ωh11 for all f1 >  1
c
f  .  In period t > 1 the incentive constraint becomes:   
Ψh1t = αf1 – f1/2 – 1
c
f  /2   1( 1)

   [f1/2 + h1/2 + 1
c
f  /2 – 1
c
h  /2 – f1αf1 + h1βh1] = Ωh1t.  This change 
introduces slack in the constraint and permits  1
c
f   to drop at least once if  
Ψh1t – Ψh11 = h1/2 − 1
c
h  /2 <  1( 1)

  h1βh1 = Ωh1t – Ωh11, or if δ > (h1− 1
c
h  )/[(1 – π)(h1− 1
c
h  ) + 2h1βh1].  
Hence, a tariff reduction is more likely if δ, h1, and/or βh1 are higher or π is lower. Ñ 
Proof of Result 3:  If the 
c
ij   are chosen so that Ωij1 = Ψij1 for all i and j, then aggregating enforcement 
capacity and deviation incentives yields deviation costs and benefits of  1 ij j   =  1 ij j  .Ñ   
Proof of Proposition 1:  Rewriting the home country’s period 1 incentive constraints for the case when 
tariff liberalization means that tariffs drop to zero at the outset of the agreement yields: 
  Ψhj1 = αfj – fj/2 – hj/2   1( 1)

   [fj/2 + hj/2 – fjαfj] = Ωhj1.     (A.1) 
For each good j we can, therefore, solve for a critical discount factor δhj, such that zero tariffs are self-
enforcing if δ ≥ 
2
2( 1 – ) + (+)
fj fj hj
fjf j f j h j
 
    


= δhj.  We now show that for two groups 1 and 2 taken 
separately it is possible that δh2 > δ > δh1, but taken together yields a discount factor δh12  δ.  The critical 
discount factor, δh12, is given by the incentive constraint Ψh11 + Ψh21 Ωh11 + Ωh21.  For these two groups 37 
 






(2 (1– )+ ( + ))
fj fj hj
j
fj fj fj hj
j








= δh12.  Rewriting δh2 as 
A/B and δh1 as C/D,  we have δh12 = (A + C)/(B + D).  It is then straightforward to verify that δh2 > δh1 
implies that δh2 > δh12 > δh1.  Hence, for all δ such that δh2 > δ  δh12 > δh1 the result obtains for zero tariffs 
in the two group case.  Next consider a group of goods 1 through N such that zero tariffs are self 
enforcing for this group, but not for group N + 1.  Writing the critical discount factor for N linked groups 
as δh1*N and proceeding in the same way as above it is immediate to see that δhN+1 > δh1*N+1 > δh1*N so that 
for all δ such that δhN+1 > δ  δh1*N+1 the result obtains. Ñ   
Proof of Proposition 2:  Adapting the proof of result 2 to the case when J – 1 goods have been added to 
the agreement and evaluating the constraint at free trade we see that slack is introduced in the incentive 
constraint if Ψh(J-1)t – Ψh(J-1)(J-1)= hJ-1/2 <  1( 1)

  hJβhJ-1 = Ωh(J-1)t – Ωh(J-1)(J-1), or if 
δ > hJ-1/[(1 – π)hJ-1+ 2hJ-1βhJ-1] so that slack is more likely to be introduced if δ, hJ-1, and/or βhJ-1 are 
higher, or if π is lower.  Consider now the case of group j.  From equation (A.1) we see that, by itself, free 
trade is enforceable for this group if Ψhjj = αfj – fj/2 – hj/2   1( 1)

  [fj/2 + hj/2 – fjαfj] = Ωhjj.  From  
proposition 1 it is possible that this equation is not satisfied by itself, however, free trade can be enforced 
when statically linked with other groups.  Note that Ψhj(j-1) – Ψh(j-1)(j-1) = Ψhjj and Ωhj(j-1) – Ωh(j-1)(j-1) = Ωhjj are 
also the marginal changes to the static case incentive constraint when adding group j in period j – 1 before 
the j – 1 investments are sunk.  Hence, if the static constraint binds with equality for groups j – 1, then it 
would not be possible to add this group j in the period j – 1.  The marginal changes in the incremental 
incentive constraint are given in equations (2.12) and (2.16) as ΨhJJ – Ψh(J-1)(J-1) =  
αfJ – fJ/2 – hJ/2 – ρf(J-1)βf(J-1) and ΩhJJ – Ωh(J-1)(J-1) =  1( 1)

  [fJ/2 + hJ/2 + h(J-1)βh(J-1) – fJαfJ].  The 
marginal gain to deviating in the incremental case is less than in static case by the increased irreversible 
sunk cost: ρf(J-1)βf(J-1).  The incremental cost to deviating is more than in the static case by the discounted 
value of the added irreversible sunk cost  1( 1)

  h(J-1)βh(J-1).  Incremental linking can, therefore, link more 38 
 
groups than static linking and its ability to link groups that static cannot link is increasing in ρ and β.  
Examination of equations (2.12) and (2.16) reveals the remainder of the comparative static predictions.Ñ   
Proof of Lemma 1:  If 
id
j  = 0, then   1*
c
J  – 1*
id
J  ≤  1* 1
c
J  – 1* 1
id
J   for all J, so ˆ J = 1.  If the fluctuations are 
i.i.d., then the condition  1*
c
J  – 1* 1
c
J  < 1*
id
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  (1 –
c




  (1 –
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j  ), or as J  > 








+ 1 =  ˆ J .  From 




j   > 0 and is non-decreasing in 
d





j   and in 
d
ij  .Ñ 
Proof of Lemma 2:  If the deviations are revealed with probability one, then 
id











.  Note that  1*
c
J  is weakly declining in J and it is strictly declining in J if the fluctuations 
are not perfectly correlated.  If the deviations are not revealed with probability one, then 
id
j   > 0.    In this 
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JJ




       
  
.  If the stochastic fluctuations are 
i.i.d., then by lemma for all  ˆ J J  ,  1* 1*( 1) 1 () ( )
ci d c i d
JJ J J       .  Furthermore,   1* 1*( 1)
cc
JJ    so that 
1*( 1) [1 ( )]
c
J      > 1* [1 ( )]
c
J    .  Hence, there exists a  ˆ J J    such that for all J J   ,  Δ(Φ, , δ) is 
declining in J.Ñ   
Proof of Proposition 3:  Rewriting the incentive constraint for the home country for the case of groups 1 
and 2 yields:  Ψh11 + Ψh21  Ωh11 + Ωh21.  For these two groups together, zero tariffs are self-enforcing if:  







(( 1 –) ) 2 + ( ) ( + )










ci d i d
fjf j f j f j h j
jj
= δh12.     (A.2) 
Rewriting 2αfj ª Aj, fj + hj ª Bj,  (( 1 –) )
ci d
j fj fj j    ª Xj, and ()
id
j   ª Yj, we have δhj = (Aj – 
Bj)/(XjAj + YjBj) and δh12 = [(A1 + A2) – (B1 + B2)]/[(X12(A1 + A2) + Y12(B1 + B2)].  First, consider the case of 
perfectly correlated fluctuations so that  12 1 2
cc c     and  12 
id = 1 
id = 2 
id .  Hence, X1 = X2 = X12 = X and 39 
 
Y1 = Y2 = Y12 = Y.  It is then straightforward to verify that δh2 > δh1 implies that X(A1B2 – B1A2) < Y(B1A2 – 
A1B2) which implies that  δh2 > δh12 > δh1.  Hence, for all δ such that δh2 > δ  δh12 > δh1 the result obtains 
for zero tariffs in the two group case.  Next consider a group of goods 1 through N such that zero tariffs 
are self enforcing for this group, but not for group N + 1.  Writing the critical discount factor for N linked 
groups as δh1*N and proceeding in the same way as above it is immediate to see that δhN+1 > δh1*N+1 > δh1*N 
so that for all δ such that δhN+1 > δ  δh1*N+1 the result obtains.   
  If the fluctuations are not perfectly correlated, then  12 1 2 min{ , }   
cc c .  Similarly, it must be the 
case that  12 
id   ≤ min{ 1 
id , 2 
id }.  This last inequality is weak because for any distribution whereby 
deviations are perfectly revealed it follows that  12 
id = 1 
id = 2 
id = 0.  We begin with the case of perfectly 
revealed deviations, so that  12 
id = 1 
id = 2 
id = 0 and, therefore, Y1 = Y2  =  Y12 = Y.  Because 
12 1 2 min{ , }  
cc c  we have that X12 < min {X1, X2}.  Hence, δhj = (Aj – Bj)/(XjAj + YBj) < δ < δh12 =  
[(A1 + A2) – (B1 + B2)]/[(X12(A1 + A2) + Y(B1 + B2)] is possible.  Note that as the correlation between the 
fluctuations decreases and/or as the number of groups increases, 1*
c
J   decreases further below the 
minimum of  1 {, . . . , }
cc
J  .  Hence, X1*J drops further below min{X1,…, XJ} and δh1*J increases further 
above the max{δh1,…,δhJ} so that δh1*J > δ  max{δh1,…,δhJ} becomes more likely.   
  If the deviations are not perfectly revealed and if the fluctuations are not perfectly correlations, 
then  12 
id  < min{ 1 
id , 2 
id }, so that Y12 > max {Y1, Y2}.  In this case, we first note that αfj > fj, and if the 
groups are reasonably symmetric, then 2αfj > fj + hj.  Hence, if they are reasonably symmetric, and if ρfj 
is reasonably large, then X12Aj + Y12Bj < min{XjAj + YjBj} so that δh12 > δ  δh2 > δh1 is again possible in 
the noisy case when it was not in the deterministic case.  If ρfj is small, then as long as the drop in 
ic   is 
not too small in comparison to the drop in 
id  , then δh12 > δ  δh2 > δh1 is possible.  From lemma 1, we 
know that when the fluctuations are uncorrelated there exists a critical number of groups,  ˆ J , so that when 
adding more than  ˆ J  groups to the agreement 
ic  is dropping faster than 
id   as more groups are added.  
Hence, when the deviations are not perfectly revealed and the fluctuations are uncorrelated, then in the 
symmetric or un-symmetric case and for any value of ρij it must be the case that as the number of groups 
exceeds  ˆ J  it becomes more likely that δh1*J > δ  max{δh1,…,δhJ}.Ñ   40 
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  The gain to deviating and the marginal gain to deviating are the same in the 
noisy and noiseless case.  From proposition 2 the marginal gain to deviating in the incremental case is less 
than in static case by the increased irreversible sunk cost: ρf(J-1)βf(J-1).   Also from proposition 2 the 
marginal cost to deviating in the incremental noiseless case minus the marginal cost to deviating in the 
static noiseless case is:  
  1( 1)

  h(J-1)βh(J-1).               ( A . 3 )  
The cost to deviating in the noisy case when J – 1 groups are to be added to the agreement in period 1 is: 




fjh j f j f j j   

   ].   
If J groups are to be added in period 1 then the cost of deviating is: 
  ΩhJ1 = Δ(Φ1*J ,, δ) [
1 /2+ /2
J
fjh j f j f j j   
   ].     
The marginal change to the cost of deviating in the static noisy case is, therefore, given by: 




fjh j f j f j j   

   ] +  
  Δ(Φ1*J, , δ)[fJ/2 + hJ/2  – fJαfJ] .         ( A . 4 )  
The marginal change to the cost of deviating in incremental noisy case is given by equation (3.18).  
Examination of equations (3.18) and (A.4) show that the cost to deviating in the incremental noisy case 
minus the cost to deviating in the static noisy case is given by: 
 [ ΩhJJ – Ωh(J-1)(J-1)] – [ΩhJ1 – Ωh(J-1)1] =  




hj hj j  

  ] + Δ(Φ1*J, , δ)[h(J-1)βh(J-1)].     (A.5) 
  If the stochastic fluctuations are perfectly correlated then Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) = Δ(Φ1*J-1, , δ) so (A.5) is 











   
     =  Δ(Φ1,  ,  δ).   Hence, if the stochastic fluctuations are 
perfectly correlated, then there is additional incremental over static linking in the noisy than in the 
noiseless case.   
  If the stochastic fluctuations are not perfectly correlated, and if the deviating tariffs are always 
perfectly revealed, then by lemma 2, Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) – Δ(Φ1*J-1, , δ) < 0 and is decreasing in J.  Also by 
lemma 2, Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) is decreasing in J.  Hence, (A.5) falls further below (A.3)  so that there is even less 
incremental linking in the noisy case when the fluctuations are not perfectly correlated.   41 
 
   If the stochastic fluctuations are uncorrelated, then by lemma 2 there exists a threshold number 
of groups, J  , so that if J  ≥ J  , then Δ(Φ1*J, , δ) – Δ(Φ1*J-1, , δ) < 0 and is decreasing in J.   Furthermore, 











    is maximized.  Hence, there exists a  ˆ JJJ      such that for all JJ    , there is less 
incremental linking in the noisy case than in the noiseless case.Ñ   
Proof of Proposition 5:  Immediate from the last two paragraphs of the proof to proposition 4.Ñ  
Proof of Proposition 6:  From lemma 2 and proposition 3, 4 and 5, if the measure of trade stability is 
lower, the stochastic fluctuations are less correlated, and/or the number of already covered groups is 
greater, then static and incremental linking will enforce free trade in fewer groups and some groups may 
only be able to enforce free trade if unlinked from other groups.Ñ 